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COMMENTS
TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION TO DOMESTIC
PROPERTY BY ALIEN BENEFICIARIES
In the United States today, every attorney who includes estate planning
in his practice, whether he be located in an urban or rural area, is confronted with the possibility of being approached by a client who wishes some
of his property to pass to residents of, or institutions in a foreign country.'
Thus, it is important for attorneys to familiarize themselves with the
obstacles which have been placed in the way of the testate or intestate transfer of personal property located in the United States to persons or institutions in foreign countries.
In 1939, as a result of the Hitler regime's assertion of power in Germany
and subsequent acts of aggression in Europe, there began a movement among
the states to restrict, by statute and court decision,2 the disposition of assets
1 Because of its immigrant population there are millions of United States citizens today
who have relatives and close friends in foreign countries, or who have charitable feelings
towards the country in which they were born or from which their ancestors migrated.
2 A number of writers have claimed that certain states have incorporated restrictions
similar to the "benefit" restrictions, infra, by court decision and not by statutory authority.
In 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 105 (1965), Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Nebraska and Vermont

are listed as such states, although no cases are cited to support this contention. In Bader,
Brown & Grzybowski, Soviet Inheritance Cases in American Courts on the Soviet Property Regime, 1966 DUKE L.J. 98, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Missouri and Vermont were
listed as states adopting the rule by local court rules but no statutes or cases were cited.
Maine was listed as a state adopting the rule by court decision and the case of Berman v.
Frendel, 154 Me. 337, 148 A.2d 93 (1959) was cited. However, the writer did not get this
impression upon reading that case. In Chaitken, The Rights of Residents of Russia and
Its Satellites to Share in Estates of American Decendants, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 297 (1952),

Pennsylvania is said to be the only state adopting the rule by court decision or local

court rule, that has reported cases showing this view. A few illustrative cases are listed.
Then Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska and Vermont are stated to observe
this practice. California is also stated to have denied distribution where benefit was
doubtful (Howaldt v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 114, 114 P.2d 333 (1941)).
It should be pointed out that in some cases, this type of contention is now outdated.
Pennsylvania, infra note 16, Michigan, infra note 18 and Massachusetts, infra note 11,
now have statutes. Caution should be taken regarding the other jurisdictions since
reported cases from which authority for this contention may be obtained, do not appear
to be available. In Chaitkin, supra, Tennessee is said to reject this rule, without prior
statutory authority. However, Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Touriansky, 197 Tenn. 245, 271
S.W.2d 1 (1954) which supposedly indicates this would, to the writer, indicate rather that
Tennessee under the proper circumstances would follow the rule without a statute.
Illinois, in In re Estate 0f Miller, 35 Il. App. 2d 349, 182 N.E.2d 913 (1962), refused to
follow the rule and withhold distribution without statutory authority.
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located in the United States to foreign residents by will or intestate succession. The unsettled conditions following World War II and the advent of
the "Cold War" provided the impetus for enactment of restrictive statutes
which expectedly received the name of "Iron Curtain Statutes. '3 These
statutes may be clasified either as "benefit" or "reciprocity" statutes. 4 The
former has found the greater acceptance and has been enacted by a number
of eastern states.5
The primary object of this legislation was to promote the basic object and obligation of Courts of decedent devolution to use their utmost endeavors to effectuate
the express or implied wishes of a decedent respecting the disposal of his assets
on death. Only subordinate to this purpose, was the effort to prevent the diversion of assets here located to foreign governments whose conceptions of the proprieties were totally at variance with those which form the basis of the national
existence of this country. 6
7
The second type of statute has been enacted by several western states.
"Reciprocity" legislation existed in a few states long before Hitler came
to power, but its number and use grew in response to the chaotic conditions
in Europe since the late 1930's. Its objective was to prevent residents of
foreign countries from sharing in estates located in the United States,
unless that foreign country granted United States citizens reciprocal rights.
Such legislation has frequently resulted in frustrating the express or
implied intent of a decedent and it has proven to be a trap for the unwary
draftsman. This comment will attempt to analyze the substance and effects
of the statutes. It will discuss problem areas in litigation and suggest possible areas of change and improvement. The discussions herein will be largely
based on the decisions of New York and California, because these states
have numerous cases dealing with their respective types of statutes while
most other jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Montana and New
Jersey, have only a few scattered cases which are not always clear.

a First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Fishman, 7 Ohio Misc. 130, 217 N.E.2d 60 (1966).
It should be pointed out that although this phrase is basically used to describe only one
of the two categories of statutes herein discussed, the writer will consider both categories
to be included with the phrase "Iron Curtain Statutes" since generally, the two categories
are discussed together and both are basically directed presently against the "Iron
Curtain" countries.
4 It must be noted that one statute may fit into both categories at the same time. E.g.,
ORE. REv. STAT. § 111.070(1)'(c) (Supp. 1957).
5 Included in this category are New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, Maryland, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Oregon.
0 In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 Misc. 524, 528, 15 N.Y.S.2d 252, 256 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
See generally Berman, Soviet Heirs In American Courts, 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 257 (1962);
Chaitkin, The Rights oj Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of
American Decendants, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952); 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 630 (1963).
7 Included in this category are California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Iowa and North
Carolina.
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By 1939, Hitler's activities in Europe had aroused great public sentiment
in the United States. However, the federal government had not yet acted
to restrict the flow of assets from this country to foreign countries under
the control of Hitler's "Wehrmacht." It was at this time that the Executive
Committee of the Surrogates' Association of the State of New York proposed
legislation to amend the Surrogates' Court Act. The express purpose of this
statute was to "authorize the deposit of money or property by the Surrogates' Court in cases where the transmission or payment to a . ..resident

in a foreign country might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in
part."s The New York legislature adopted the proposed amendment, which
read as follows:
Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of a trust would
not have the benefit or use or control of the money or other property due him, or
where other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payment
should be withheld, the decree may direct that such money or other property be
paid into the surrogates' court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be
entitled thereto. Such money or other property so paid into court shall be paid
out only by the special order of the surrogate or pursuant to the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction.9
Similar legislation presently exists in New Jersey, 10 Massachusetts,"
Rhode
17

Island, 12

Maryland, 14

Connecticut, 13
8

9

Florida,15

Pennsylvania, 16

20

Ohio, Michigan,' Wisconsin,' and Oregon. The legislation authorizes
the withholding of property which would otherwise be distributed in a
foreign country unless it appears that the person or institution having the
right to the property will in fact receive its benefits, use, and control. The
812 BUFFALO L. REV. 630, 631 (1963) quoting: Comment, N.Y. ANN. Civ. PEAc. ACTS
398 (14 Nichols-Cahill); Chaitkin, supra note 6, at 300.
9 N.Y. SnuR. CT. ACT § 269a(1) (1939).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-10 (1953).
11 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, § 27B (Supp. 1964).
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-13-13 (1956).
13 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 45-278(1958).
14 MD.ANN. CODE art 93, § 161 (1961).
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.28 (1960).
16

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1156 (Supp. 1966).

17 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.81 (Baldwin 1964).
18 MICH.STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(306a)

19 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 318.06(8)(b)

(1962).

(1958).

20 ORE. LAWS ch. 111, § .070 (1951).
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property is held by the court or other authorized public body until such
time as the person having a right to it will receive its "benefit." '21 These
statutes place the burden of proving that the "benefit" will be received upon
22
the distributee claiming the property.
Since the end of World War II, the thrust of such legislation has been
aimed at the countries behind the "Iron Curtain." The courts have used
many different criteria in determining whether the legatee, distributee or
beneficiary will receive the "benefit" of the property in question, but the
result had until recently, almost always been the same. The cases had held,
generally, that the person or institution behind the "Iron Curtain" would
not receive the full benefit of the property and therefore payment was to be
withheld.
The criteria used by the courts in determining whether to invoke a
"benefit" statute include: (1) the "proscribed list," 23 a regulation of the

United States Treasury Department; 24 (2) judicial notice of particular
facts; 25 (3) abundance of, or lack of proof that the distributee will receive
the "benefit"; 26 (4) letters received from departments of the federal government, such as the Department of State, expressing its opinion on whether a
21 In re Braier, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Petition of Mazurowski, 331
Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954); In re Markewitsh, 62 N.J. Super. 407, 163 A.2d 232
(1960); see Jones, Iron Curtain Distributees: A Mounting Problem in Pennsylvania's
Orphans' Courts, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 227 (1965).
22
1n re Saniuk's Estate, 40 Misc. 2d 437, 243 N.Y.S.2d 47, aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 922,
251 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1963) ; In re Volencki, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26 (1955) ; First
Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Fishman, supra note 3.
23 Jones, supra note 21, at 240.
24 In re Braier, supra note 21; In re Saniuk's Estate, supra note 22; In re Siegler's
Will, 284 App. Div. 436, 132 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1954) ; In re Estate of Petroff, 49 Misc. 2d
233, 267 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Surr. Ct. 1966) ; In re Offinger's Estate, 28 Misc. 2d 633, 215
N.Y.S.2d 642 (Surr. Ct. 1961) ; In re Getream's Estate, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ;
In re Best's Estate, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Petition of Mazurowski, supra note 21; In re Estate of Birkner, 90 N.J. Super. 91, 216 A.2d 258 (1966);
In re Markewitsh, supra note 21; In re Urls Estate, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 71 A.2d 665
(1950) ; In re Aras' Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (Orphan's Ct. 1959).
25
In re Buszta's Estate, 18 Misc. 2d 716, 186 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Surr. Ct. 1959); In re
Getream's Estate, supra note 24; In re Miller's Estate, 181 Misc. 88, 45 N.Y.S.2d 485
(Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Landau's Estate, 172 Misc. 651, 16 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ;
In re Blasis' Estate, 172 Misc. 587, 15 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; In re Steiner's
Estate, 172 Misc. 950, 16 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Estate of Birkner, supra
note 24; In re Volenki, supra note 22; In re Url's Estate, supra note 24; In re Belemecich's
Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963).
26 Brizgys v. County Treasurer of Union County, 84 N.J. Super. 485, 202 A.2d 709
(1964); In re Reidl's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 171, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1965); In re Saniuk's
Estate, supra note 22; In re Kina's Estate, 49 Misc. 2d 598, 268 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Surr.
Ct. 1966) ; In re Well's Estate, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Surr. Ct. 1953) ; In re
Bold's Estate, 173 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Surr. Ct. 1940) ; In re Estate of Birkner,
supra note 24.
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distributee will receive the property in the particular country; 27 (5) the
exchange rate from dollars into the foreign countries' own currency since
the exchange rate may, in and of itself, be used to confiscate the money
to be distributed; 28 and (6) the principle of stare decisis, relying on past
decisions which have decided whether or not a person in a particular country
will receive the "benefit. '29 Of these criteria, the "proscribed list" is most
often used. In many cases this alone may be the basis of a decision.9 0 Judicial
notice has also occasionally been used alone 31 but it is usually used, as are
the remaining criteria, in conjunction with the Treasury Regulation or some
other criterion.3 2 Because of the many disparate factors and the inconsistency
of their application, the case law in this area is in a state of confusion and
uncertainty. It will be pointed out later that this lack of clarity in the cases
is possibly responsible for much of the criticism of the "benefit" type of
legislation.
The Treasury Department periodically publishes a list of countries to which
checks or warrants drawn against funds of the government of the United
States cannot be transmitted because "postal, transportation, or banking
facilities in general or local conditions in [these countries] . . . are such

that there is not a reasonable assurance that a payee in those areas will
27 1n
8

re Url's Estate, supra note 24.

In re Greenberg's Will, 24 App. Div. 2d 435, 260 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1965); In re Shefsick's Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 293, 270 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Surr. Ct. 1966); In re Szabados' Will,
40 Misc. 2d 1072, 244 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Surr. Ct. 1963) ; In re Tybus' Estate, 28 Misc. 2d
278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961); Petition of Mazurowski, supra note 21; In re
Estate of Birkner, supra note 24; In re Url's Estate, supra note 24; In re Estate of
Petroff, supra note 24; In re Kina's Estate, supra note 26.
29 A fine example of the use of stare decisis is a series of cases involving distributees
residing in Poland. The series began with In re Tybus' Estate, supra note 28. In this
case, the court made its own investigation by actually going to Poland. It was a very
unusual case and in the next year the courts in In re Swiderski's Estate, 29 Misc. 2d 480,
217 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Surr. Ct. 1961) and in In re Groncky's Estate, 230 N.Y.S.2d 181
(Surr. Ct. 1962), in very short opinions, ordered payment to distributees in Poland on
the basis of the Tybus decision. Numerous other similar decisions may be found.
It must be pointed out that the court, in In re Kina's Estate, supra note 26, recently
criticized reliance on any previous case and, specifically referring to the cases following
Tybus, held that stare decisis is not applicable to cases that are litigated entirely on a
question of fact. The court here determined that the facts did not satisfactorily show
that the distributees would receive the benefit of the estate.
3O In re Braier, supra note 21; In re Siegler's Will, supra note 24; In re Offinger's
Estate, supra note 24; In re Best's Estate, supra note 24; In re Markewitsh, supra note 21.
31In re Miller's Estate, supra note 25; In re Landau's Estate, supra note 25; In re
Volencki, supra note 22; In re Belemecich's Estate, supra note 25.
32 In re Estate of Petroff, supra note 24; In re Saniuk's Estate, supra note 22; In re
Well's Estate, supra note 26; In re Getream's Estate, supra note 24; In re Kina's Estate,
supra note 26; Petition of Mazurowski, supra note 21; In re Aras' Estate, supra note 24;
In re Estate of Birkner, supra note 24; In re Url's Estate, supra note 24.
2
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actually receive checks or warrants ...and be able to negotiate the same
for value."3 3 The present regulation lists the following countries and areas:
Albania, Communist Controlled China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the Russian Zone of Occupation of Germany, and the
34
Russian Sector of Occupation of Berlin, Germany.
Some of the earlier decisions held that the "Treasury Regulation" was a
statement of federal policy on the question of distribution of funds.3 5 However, the more recent decisions recognize that this regulation is not a statement of policy and is not intended to be controlling on the states in their
distribution of estates within their control.3 6 Nevertheless, most courts
rely heavily on the regulation, reasoning that the federal government is
better informed about the situation in these foreign lands and that, if there
is reason to doubt the proper receipt and use of checks or warrants drawn
against the United States, there should be no less reason to doubt the proper
receipt of private funds to be distributed by the courts.3 7 Certainly, some
of this reliance may also be attributed to the general mistrust of Communist
Governments.
Most of the writers and at least one court, in the past, have noted that
there may be an almost irrebuttable presumption created against the existence
of "benefit" in a particular country by the use of the Treasury Regulation. 8
"Where regulations of the United States Treasury Department prohibit the
transmission of funds of the United States to foreign countries, the burden
of proving benefit may be virtually insurmountable. 3 9 The creation of such
an irrebuttable presumption, it is said, is emphasized in cases where the
court takes judicial notice of certain facts which by themselves indicate that
the distributee will not get the "benefit."
It should be noted that the courts do not take judicial notice that the
distributee will not receive the benefit, use, or control of the property to be
distributed, but rather, certain facts and circumstances which may very well
indicate that benefit of the property will not be received. For example, the
3 16 Fed. Reg. 1818 (1951).
34 16 Fed. Reg. 1818 (1951) as amended, 31 C.F.R. § 211.2(a) (1966).
35 In re Best's Estate, supra note 24; see 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 630, 631 (1963).
36 In re Saniuk's Estate, supra note 22; Berman, supra note 6; see 12 BUFFALO L. REV.
630, 631 (1963).
37 In re Braier, supra note 21; In re Markewitsh, supra note 21; see Berman, supra
note 6.
38 Bader, Brown & Grzybowski, Soviet Inheritance Cases in American Courts and the
Soviet Property Regime, 1966 DUKE L.J. 98. Jones, supra note 21; In re Saniuk's Estate,
supra note 22, at 439, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
39 Jones, supra note 21, at 239.
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courts notice that, "there can be no doubt that [a particular country] is a
self-proclaimed Communist state. ' 40 "The court will [also] take judicial
notice that the countries mentioned in the Treasury Regulation are behind
the so-called Iron Curtain . . . Common knowledge tells us that private
ownership of property has been abolished in the Soviet Union, and its satellite nations ....41
Many of the courts which use judicial notice recognize that:
[A] literal interpretation of the statute authorizes its use by the court without
positive proof of the intended beneficiaries' lack of control. While none of the
cases referred to establish the proposition that the statutory bridle may be based
on judicial notice alone, it is felt that since nothing is taken away and all is preserved until the court receives convincing assurances that distributive shares will
reach their proper
destination, common knowledge of obstacles on the way should
42
be sufficient.
The burden is upon the claimant to submit all the evidence he might have
directly bearing on the existence of "benefit." The evidence must be sufficient, first, to remove doubts created by judicial notice that in the particular
"Iron Curtain" country, property rights are secure according to the standards in the United States. Such evidence must show that rights in the
property to be distributed would not be distributed. The evidence must
also show that the doubts of the federal government, expressed in the
Treasury Regulation, as to checks and warrants drawn against it ever fully
reaching the designated payee, do not exist as to the property to be
distributed.
The great majority of cases that have relied on either the Treasury Regulation or judicial notice, or both, appear to have done so because there was
very little if any contradictory evidence introduced to prove that a distributee
would receive the benefit of his property if distributed. 43 Since the "benefit"
statutes place the burden of proving that full benefit will be received upon
the distributee, one cannot hope to win his share of an estate without introducing at least some evidence that he will receive the benefit of that share.
40 In re Belemecich's Estate, supra note 25, at 509, 192 A.2d at 741.
41 First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Fishman, supra note 3, at 141, 217 N.E.2d at 67.
See also cases cited in note 25, supra.
42
In re Volencid, supra note 22, at 353, 114 A.2d at 27.
48 In re Greenberg's Will, supra note 28; In re Siegler's Will, supra note 24; In re
Kina's Estate, supra note 26; In re Torsky's Will, 36 Misc. 2d 101, 232 N.Y.S.2d 183
(Surr. Ct. 1962) ; In re Wells' Estate, supra note 26; In re Bold's Estate, supra note 26;
Brizgys v. County Treasurer of Union County, supra note 26; Petition of Mazurowski,
supra note 21; First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Fishman, supra note 3.

It must be noted that some courts still rely heavily on the Treasury Regulation even
where there is considerable evidence to the contrary. See e.g., State Land Board v. Pekarek,
234 Ore. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963).
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Many writers feel that it is not "objective justice," but merely a prejudice
against all Communist countries, which is responsible for the presumption
that the governments behind the "Iron Curtain" will confiscate money and
other property inherited from or bequeathed by residents of the United'
States. With regard to the possibility of confiscation by an "Iron Curtain"
country, a few well-known authorities on foreign law have agreed with
Harold J. Berman, Professor of Law at Harvard University, who stated:
The evidence of such a likelihood is so slight, and the language of many judges
so tinged with emotion, that it is difficult to resist the suspicion that in these
particular cases many of our courts have departed from their usual standards of
objective justice.
This suspicion is reinforced by experiences that do not appear in the published
reports. The writer was in a Philadelphia court during the trial of a case involving
a Soviet claim to funds in an estate when the judge turned to the spectators and
said

. .

. "If you want to say that I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it comes

to Communism I'm a bigoted anti-Communist." Another judge said, in such a case,
"I am not going to send money to Russia where it can go into making bullets
which may one day be used against my son." Another judge, asked if he would
consent to hearing argument on the law, replied, "No, I won't send any money to
44
Russia."
However, it appears that while the emotionalism pointed out by Professor
Berman does exist, it is not as prevalent as might be indicated by the above
quote. In the reported cases, such emotional and prejudicial statements do
not often appear. When such statements do appear, they are generally to
emphasize the importance of facts and circumstances of which the court is
45
taking judicial notice.
What is required to overcome the presumption, created by placing the
burden of proof on the claimant and the already existing evidence against
the existence of "benefit," is not clear. The distributee must prove that
there is nothing in the laws of the country in which he resides that prevents
him from having the benefit, use, or control of the property to be distributed.
He must also show that, in fact, he will be allowed to receive the benefit,
use, and control of the property. However, it has been said that "the problem of proving such a factual likelihood-or absence thereof-is a staggering
one." 46 "The proofs, it appears, cannot be merely persuasive, but must be
Berman, supra note 6, at 257.
For example, in In re Belemecich's Estate in which Yugoslavian heirs were attempting
to obtain distribution of their inheritance from an estate probated in Pennsylvania, the
court judicially noticed certain facts and circumstances, similar to those discussed above,
which, without contradictory evidence, led to the conclusion that the heir would not
receive the full benefit, use and control of their shares of the estate. After reaching this
conclusion the court showed its feelings by saying "It could be that the greedy, gluttonous
grasp of the government collector in Yugoslavia does not clutch as rapaciously as his
brother confiscator in Russia. . . ." 411 Pa. 506, 511, 192 A.2d 740, 742 (1963).
46 Berman, supra note 6, at 263.
44

45
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conclusive of the question. The quality of the proofs must, it would follow,
be exceptional. Expert testimony should be introduced." '
Expert testimony might include: (1) testimony of banking officials versed
in the mechanics of international transactions and familiar with the practices of the banks in foreign countries and the extent of control over them
by the governments of those countries; (2) statements and certificates of
government officials; 48 and (3) testimony of possibly the most persuasive
of all experts, attorneys trained in the laws and legal practices of the particular "Iron Curtain" countries, especially when they themselves have practiced law in those countries. Such witnesses and other evidence may be very
difficult to find and may add great expense to the litigation. However, it
has been proven in very recent years that if strong evidence of the above
nature can be introduced, the courts will allow distribution, and the pre49
sumption that does exist can be overcome.
The case of In re Haab,5° decided in 1961, involved an Estonian national
who came to the United States under a travel visa and while here, claimed
her portion of an estate the distribution of which had previously been withheld. She personally testified that she would receive the benefit of the funds
in question if payment were made to her. The court, with little discussion,
ordered payment.
In In re Szabados' Will,51 a resident and national of Hungary, in 1963,
claimed a bequest. Evidence was submitted, showing that funds could be
transmitted to Hungary through banking channels in excess of the official
exchange rate and that the beneficiary could come to the United States to
collect the funds if he were given advance payment sufficient to pay for his
trip to this country. The court found that the evidence satisfactorily indicated
that the beneficiary would receive the benefit of the moneys due him. However, it must be noted that, as in the Haab case, the beneficiary had to come
to the United States on the partial payment made to him for this purpose,
in order to receive the balance.
47

Jones, supra note 21, at 239.
48 However, due to the general mistrust and fear of Communist countries, officials of
the United States carry much more weight than officials of "Iron Curtain" countries.
49 This is not to say that weighty evidence of "benefit" will always result in distribution. Anytime there is an issue of fact, courts will treat the same evidence differently
and different decisions will be reached. In the type of litigation discussed herein, different
results upon similar evidence of "benefit" will occur, many times, because a particular
court may be more prejudiced than others and for this reason, or for numerous others,
may give greater weight to the Treasury Regulation and facts judicially noticed than is
called for. See, In re Shefsick's Estate, supra note 28; In re Greenberg's Will, supra
note 28; State v. Pekarek, supra note 43.
50 31 Misc. 2d 878, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Surr. Ct. 1961).

51 Supra note 28.
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In re Saniuk's Estate,52 another 1963 case, involved several distributees
of an estate, first probated in 1940, who claimed their shares as residents
and nationals of Russia. When distribution had first been withheld, they
were residents of Poland. After placing upon the claimant the burden of
proof that the Russian nationals would receive the benefit, use, and control
of the property, the court stated that:
In Matter of Braier ... the Court of Appeals approved of reliance upon United
States Treasury Regulations and policy in arriving at a determination that an
alien legatee would not have the benefit or use or control of money on deposit.
The respondent in this proceeding apparently in reliance upon this decision has
raised no issue as to the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioners. In
the Braier case the Court of Appeals held the Treasury Department's conclusions
to be directly relevant to the Surrogate's determination under Section 269 (now
§ 269-a) of the Surrogate's Court Act. However, I find nothing in the opinion
to indicate that the Court held this to be the exclusive consideration. .... 53
It seems apparent that the Surrogate should, and in54fact must, consider other
equally relevant factors in reaching his determination.
The burden placed upon the distributees by the Legislature should not be extended to create an irrebuttable presumption. 5
The evidence submitted in the Saniuk case included: (1) a letter from
an official of the American Express Company stating that remittances to
the Soviet Union had been readily made through the Bank of Foreign Trade
in Moscow and that the company has always received proof of payment
without difficulty; (2) a letter from the American Embassy in Moscow
stating that it is their understanding that Soviet heirs may receive and dispose of an inheritance from abroad; and (3) a letter from the distributees
themselves, to the same effect. The court, on the basis of such evidence,
ordered payment of the funds.
The Saniuk opinion would certainly seem to indicate that the existing
presumption is not irrebuttable. It appears that the type of evidence presented in Saniuk is relatively simple and inexpensive to obtain. In addition,
once such letters have been presented in one case, they may serve as precedent
for future cases. Expert testimony should be considered in any of these cases,
but, as would appear from Saniuk, it may not be as absolutely essential as
some have felt.
Although contradictory judicial decisions would not appear to be likely if
one believes that there is an irrebuttable or almost irrebuttable presumption
against the existence of "benefit," it has happened that cases relatively close
52Supra note 22.
53In re Saniuk's Estate supra note 22, at 438, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49.
54 Id. at 438, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
55 Id.

at 439, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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in time have reached opposite conclusions as to the existence of "benefit"
in a given country. Perhaps the best example of this occurred in New York.
In 1963, in the case of In re Reidl's Estate56 the surrogate court held that
the evidence presented to it on a new method of distribution, payment to
residents of Czechoslovakia by Tuzex Certificates, did not convince it that
benefit of the funds in question would be received if distributed. In 1965,
the high court of New York reversed the lower court.57 The court held that
"when the surrogate should use his discretion to apply the section depends
on the proof before him." 58 After discussing the proof, the high court ordered
payment of the funds by the use of this new method.5 9
Then in 1966, in In re Shefsick's Estate,6° the surrogate court again
heard evidence on the Tuzex Certificates. From the evidence, the court concluded "that through the use of the Tuzex program a beneficiary of an
American estate receives twice the official rate of exchange."' 61 However,
the court was not satisfied with this, and discussed the fact that twice the
official rate of exchange was still much lower than the "market place rate of
exchange." 62 Most cases appear to disregard the market place rate of exchange. Professor Berman, in carefully analyzing rate of exchange as a test
for the existence of "benefit," is highly critical of considering the rate of
exchange of currency of countries behind the "Iron Curtain" in the market
place in the free world, due to the fact that many of these countries make
Misc. 2d 805, 242 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Surr. Ct. 1963).
re Reidl's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 171, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1965).
58 Id. at 172, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
59 "The proof here shows a plan called the Tuzex Program which was put into effect
in 1958. It was shown that there is an organization in Czechoslovakia called the Tuzex
Foreign Trade Organization. It maintains stores in Czechoslovakia and also has purchasing agents here and possibly in other countries. It publishes a catalogue of merchandise
it has for sale with fixed prices. The articles may be obtained either in the stores or by
order to be fulfilled by the purchasing agent in the foreign country. Purchases are paid
for in certificates issued by the organization. Upon delivery of the merchandise, a
receipt is obtained from the consignee. The recipient of a certificate may either use it
himself or transfer it. The proof was that such certificates have been widely used and
there is no record that any such certificates, or the merchandise represented by it, has
been confiscated, either directly, through the imposition of taxes, manipulation of exchange rates, or otherwise." In re Reidl's Will, supra note 57, at 172, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
This program was the basis of other decisions which allowed distribution to citizens of
Czechoslovakia, infra. Evidence of the system and its past success should certainly be
the spearhead used by an attorney for a distributee in Czechoslovakia. However, reliance
should not be placed entirely on the program, infra. See, In re Estate of Petroff, supra
note 24, for a program in Bulgaria, known as Corecom, which is very similar to the
Tuzex program.
60 50 Misc. 2d 293, 270 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Surr. Ct. 1966).
61 Id. at 295, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
62 The court here took judicial notice of the market place rate of exchange, thus
putting before itself additional evidence not normally considered by other courts.
5639

57

In
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it illegal to take their currency into or out of the country.6 3 Czechoslovakia
is one such country. Thus, the rate of exchange found in the United States
is a black market rate of exchange and as such is an unfair indicator. This
argument was discussed in Shefsick but was disregarded as being irrelevant
as it was in In re Greenberg's Will,64 another case denying distribution on
the basis of the black market rate of exchange. Since the court was not convinced that the distributees would receive the benefit of the estate, distribution was withheld. The opinion distinguished the Reidl decision since in that
case the market place rate of exchange was not brought up.
Shortly after Shefsick, the surrogate court probated another estate in
which heirs in Czechoslovakia again had an interest. In In re Karman's
Estate,6 5 the court observed that:
Various and conflicting reports have heretofore been made to this court concerning the probability of certain foreign nationals receiving the full benefit of
legacies or distributive shares sent from estates in this country.
Diverse opinions have been written in various jurisdictions along these lines. 66
The court then concluded from the evidence, that the Tuzex system of
distributing the estate would be likely to give the benefit of the estate to
the distributees. The court pointed out that its conclusions as to fact were
the same as those reached in the Reidl case in the appellate court. The court
did not discuss the decision in Shefsick, nor did the issue of the market place
rate of exchange appear.
Recent decisions allowing distribution to countries behind the "Iron
Curtain" on the basis of the facts presented are not limited to New York.
One of the most recent New Jersey cases is In re Estate of Birkner. 7 The
court, in quoting an earlier New Jersey decision, noted:
It is the obligation of our courts, under this statute ...

left to an
mitted to
shares will
knowledge

to make sure that funds

individual or institution behind the Iron Curtain can safely be transthe beneficiary. There must be convincing proof that the distributive
reach their proper destination. We may not turn away from the common
of obstacles which stand in the way of that desired achievement.68

63 Berman, Soviet Heirs In American Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 267-68 (1962).
64 Supra note 28.

65 51 Misc. 2d 707, 273 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Surr. Ct. 1966).
66In re Karman's Estate, 51 Misc. 2d 707, 708, 273 N.Y.S.2d 685, 685-86 (Surr. Ct.
1966).

67 Supra note 24.
68
In re Estate of Birkner, supra note 24, at 95, 216 A.2d at 261: The case quoted
from Brizgys v. County Treasurer of Union County, supra note 26, at 498, 202 A.2d
at 709.
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The court went on to state that when distribution is to be made to a country
listed on the Treasury Regulation, "extreme caution" 69 should be used.
The proofs submitted by the distributee in Birkner included: (1) evidence
from the Manager of the International Banking Department of the New
Jersey Bank and Trust Company, that banking channels were open to Czechoslovakia; (2) testimony of a Czechoslovakian official to the effect that there
were no taxes on property inherited by Czechoslovakian citizens from foreign
countries and that such inheritances could be taken in Czechoslovakian money
at twice the official exchange rate, in Tuzex Certificates, or both; and (3) a
letter from a beneficiary of an American estate already distributed to him,
stating that he had received the money and its full benefit, use and control.
The court, in ordering distribution, observed that "each case must stand or
fall on the proofs adduced ....,,70
One of the best informed critics of "Iron Curtain" legislation, Professor
Berman, does not appear to suggest that it is possible to remove the normal
prejudices against the "Iron Curtain" countries. He admits that a "probate
court has every reason to inquire whether the [beneficiary] is permitted
under Soviet law, and is likely in fact, to receive the money and to have
the use of it." 71 But Professor Berman goes on to say:
Neither the statutory authority nor the inherent jurisdiction of the court to
protect the distributee and to prevent frustration of the testator's wishes justifies
the creation of such an irrebuttable presumption. While it may be proper to impose upon the claimant the burden of proving that there is nothing in Soviet law
that prevents the Soviet Heir from having the benefit, use and control of funds
in American estates, once he has satisfied this burden, the court should impose
the burden of proving a factual likelihood of illegal confiscation of diversion of
the funds by Soviet Government officials upon the party alleging such a factual
72

likelihood.

There is a great deal of validity in this suggestion, and the prejudicial weight
still given in some cases to the Treasury Regulation and facts judicially
noticed 73 would be greatly limited by this change.
Professor Berman has further stated:
[S]o far as [he] .. .has been able to determine from judicial opinions from con-

versations with lawyers who have appeared on both sides of this issue, and from
conversations with Soviet citizens, there is not a single known instance of con69

1n re Estate of Birkner, 90 N.J. Super. 91, 96, 216 A.2d 258, 262 (1966).

70

1d. at 99, 216 A.2d at 264.

71

Berman, supra note 63, at 263.

72 Id. at 263-64.
73

Supra note 49.
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fiscation by the Soviet Government, or diversion by its
officials, of funds in an
estate sent to a Soviet citizen from a foreign country. 74
If this be true, such conversations, judicial opinions, and letters should be
used more often in court as evidence of "benefit." Such evidence is available
and, as demonstrated in the Saniuk and Reidl cases, a little ingenuity can
certainly produce more. An attorney hoping to win an estate for foreign
heirs or legatees must become aware of the problems of proof facing him and
also of the fact that the problems may not be as insurmountable as some
writers in the field have indicated.
Occasionally, the effect of a treaty between the United States and a country
behind the "Iron Curtain" becomes important in obtaining distribution of
an estate probated in a "benefit" state. Consider the existence of a treaty
in which two countries agree to allow free transfer of property between
countries by will or inheritance. 75 Since a treaty is supreme to any state
law, 76 no state could prevent such a transfer of rights to the property. Such
a treaty had been thought not to prevent the application of a "benefit" type
of statute since such legislation does not prevent the transfer of rights to the
property but only prevents its distribution temporarily.
It is true ...

that a treaty between this country and a foreign power becomes

the supreme law of the land and any local statute must yield if there is a conflict
between the two ...
And whatever may be said as to [such a treaty's] application to substantive
rights it certainly was not binding as to merely procedural matters. The decree
of the Surrogate has not deprived the . . . legatees of their property, and only

as a matter of procedure it has been set aside for their benefit and account until
such a time as reasonable assurance be given that they will receive it.77
However, it now appears that this view has been overruled by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and now a treaty of the above nature will preclude application of the "benefit" statutes. 78 Thus, in addition to factual
Berman, supra note 63, at 263.
Care must be taken when determining that a treaty allows free transfer between
the countries. Similar treaties may be interpreted differently. For example, in Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), a treaty was interpreted as only an agreement on free transfer of property from one country to another, if the person transferring the property
from the former was a national of the latter. This interpretation will, in many cases,
mean that the decision cannot be rested on the treaty. On the other hand, in Kolovrat
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the treaty in Clark v. Allen was not controlling on the interpretation of
other treaties and the court preceded to hold that the treaty before it was an agreement
between countries to allow free transfer of property between their residents whether or
not they were nationals of th country in which the potential recipient resided.
76 Kolovrat v. Oregon, supra note 75; Clark v. Allen, supra note 75.
77 In re Siegler's Will, supra note 24, at 438-39, 132 N.Y.S.2d at 394. Petition of
Mazurowski, supra note 21; See also, In re Belemecich's Estate, supra note 25.
78 Consul General of Yugoslavia, at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 (1963).
74
75
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proof as to "benefit" distribution of an estate may be obtained under a
treaty, if one exists.
It appears that the "benefit" type of statute has not been seriously questioned in litigation along constitutional lines, other than upon the question
of supremacy of a treaty. An attempt was made to test the constitutionality
of New York's statute, by an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States after the New York courts withheld distribution of an estate to a
resident of England who had been made a gift of the interest by a Czechoslovakian beneficiary of the estate. The appeal was denied for lack of a
federal question. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, apparently agreeing
with the appellant's contention that the New York regulations might "impair
the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."'79 This is the attitude
that some writers have taken in the past.80
Another consideration regarding the "benefit" statutes is the date at which
the court's inquiry should be directed. This may be an extremely important
point, although the courts rarely seem concerned with it. In "benefit" states,
the essential date for inquiry is the date upon which distribution is to be
ordered. If "benefit" is not found to be present on that date, distribution
will be withheld until a future time, when the question is again raised and
"benefit" is shown to exist. It is important to note, then, that should a
treaty be enacted or expire either between the death of the decedent and
the time of probate, or between death and application for distribution, it
must be taken into account. The same consideration is true of changes in
facts and circumstances in the foreign country during this interim period.
Such changes will have a decided impact on whether distribution will be
ordered.
"RECIPROCITY"

STATUTES

The minority of states presently having "Iron Curtain Statutes" have the
type known as "reciprocity" statutes. California's statute in this area is
representative. The pertinent sections 8l read as follows:
The right of aliens not residing in the United States or its territories to take
personal property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon
the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is
dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take personal property upon the same terms and
79 Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 32 (1962).
80 15 BU FALO L. REV. 105 (1966); 12 BUlTALO L. REV. 630, 637-38 (1963).
81 There is a preceding portion of the first section which is deleted. It is almost
exactly the same as the portion shown but it pertains to real, rather than personal property. Since there are numerous other considerations to be taken into account in considering
real property in this context, it has been deleted from the scope of this paper.
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conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens
82
are residents.
The burden shall be upon such nonresident aliens to establish the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights. ....
If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heirs other than such
aliens are found eligible to take such property the property shall be disposed of
84
as escheated property.
.3

Other states having this form of enactment include Oregon, 5 Montana,8 6
Nevada,8 7 Iowa,88 and North Carolina.8 9
"Reciprocity" statutes, in theory, bear distinct differences from the
"benefit" statutes of the New York type. One obvious distinction is that
the "benefit" statute does not affect a distributee's right to the money or
other personal property, but only determines the time at which such a
distributee will in fact be allowed to receive it. On the other hand, the "reciprocity" statutes determine whether a distributee has any right to the
property. If the distributee is a resident of a country which does not offer
United States citizens equal inheritance rights with its own citizens, then
residents of that foreign country are not given inheritance rights in "reciprocity" states and therefore the intended beneficiary receives no right in
the estate in question.
The method of investigating the foreign law should, theoretically, be different in "benefit" and "reciprocity" states. In the "benefit" states, the courts
look to the inheritance rights of the foreign distributee, as far as law and
practice, to determine whether the distributee is granted rights sufficient to
allow him to receive the benefit, use and control of an inheritance. The "reciprocity" statute, however, tests not the rights of the foreign distributee, but
rather the rights of an American distributee to determine whether the latter
is afforded the same rights as the foreign citizen is given by his own country,
whatever those rights may be.90
"Reciprocity" statutes, like the "benefit" statutes, place the burden of
82

CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259 (1947).

83 CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259.1 (1947).
84
85

CAL. PROB. CODE, § 259.2 (1947).
ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 111.070 (1957).

86MONT. REV. CODE § 91.520 (1947).
87

NEV. REv. STAT. § 134.230 (1957).

88

IowA CODE § 567.8 (1958).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3 to -5 (1965).
90 It should be noted that, although "reciprocity" does not require that one country
give the citizens of the other, rights equal with those given to its own citizens by the
latter, there is a requirement that the former give some minimum substantive rights.
89

See, In re Estate of Larkin, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966).
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proof on the person or persons claiming the existence of reciprocity. However,
the existence of "reciprocity" has been treated more as a question of fact than
has the existence of "benefit." 91 This is due: (1) to the fact that the court
cannot readily take judicial notice of facts indicating the non-existence of
reciprocity; and (2) the absence of any applicable federal regulation or rule. 92
Thus, there is generally no already existing evidence, and "reciprocity" is
therefore easier to prove than "benefit."
It has never been claimed that there is a strong, almost irrebuttable presumption against the existence of "reciprocity." However, it has been claimed
that courts in "reciprocity" states place too much emphasis on factors involved in determining whether one will receive the benefit of the property.
Such factors are immaterial to whether or not "reciprocity" exists. The cases
most often cited in connection with this objection are Estate of Nersisian9"
and Estate of Gogabashvele,94 two California decisions. In Nersisian the court,
in quoting the lower court opinion, made the following statement on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to show "reciprocity": "You
might have the law on it but as a matter of fact how are you going to prove
that any distribution to be made here to a Russian subject under Russia would
be distributed to him and not taken by the Russian Government?" 95 Four
years later, in Gogabashvele, the court, in finding that no reciprocity existed
between the United States and Russia, used an analysis of the Soviet form of
government as determinative of the question. In short, the court found that
United States citizens have been allowed to inherit estates in the Soviet
Union, not as a matter of right but rather, as a matter of privilege. The court
held that "where such a taking [by United States citizens] is merely a matter
of sufferance there is no 'reciprocal right' within the meaning of the code
section." 96 The analysis of the Russian form of government and its comparison
to our own would appear to be immaterial if in fact United States citizens are
allowed to inherit Russian estates. The fact that Russia can, at any time,
prevent such past practice would appear irrelevant. The Gogabashvele
91 Again, this is not to say that reciprocity will always be found by a court upon the
introduction of weighty evidence of its existence. But see, In re Estate of Chichernea,
57 Cal. Rptr. 135, 424 P.2d 687 (1967); In re Estate of Larkin, supra note 90; In re
Estate of Miller, 104 Cal. App. 2d 1, 230 P.2d 667 (1951) ; In re Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.
App. 2d 232, 150 P.2d 567 (1944) ; In re Estate of Hasova, 143 Mont. 74, 387 P.2d 305
(1963); In re Estate of Ginn, 136 Mont. 338, 347 P.2d 467 (1959); In re Estate of
Spoya, 129 Mont. 83, 282 P.2d 452 (1955); In re Estate of Gaspar's, 128 Mont. 383,
275 P.2d 656 (1954) ; In re Stoian's Estate, 128 Mont. 52, 269 P.2d 1085 (1954).
92 Id.
93 155 Cal. App. 2d 561, 318 P.2d 168 (1957).
94 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961).
95

1n re Estate of Nersisian, 155 Cal. App. 2d 561, 566, 318 P.2d 168, 171 (1961).

96 In re Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 508, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (1961).
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opinion, in addition, discusses the Treasury Regulation which would also seem
irrelevant to the existence of "reciprocity."
However, two very recent California decisions appear to have removed this
objectionable practice. In In re Estate of Larkin,07 two cases were consolidated. The beneficiaries resided in and were nationals of the Soviet Union.
"In both cases the trial court received extensive evidence . .. concerning the
written law and actual practice of the Soviet Union in matters of inheritance
involving citizens of the United States."9 8 The uncontradicted evidence established that United States citizens are allowed to share in Soviet estates "upon
the same terms and conditions as do Soviet citizens" '99 and that United States
citizens do receive and will continue to receive "economically significant
interests in Soviet estates."' 0 0
The court recognized that California's "reciprocity" statute "imparts a
requirement that the inheritance rights recognized in the foreign country meet
some minimal standard of economic substantiality and that it be shown that
such rights are regularly recognized in practice."'' 1 Nevertheless, it held that:
Nothing in the language or history of the statute suggested that the Legislature,
in restricting the freedom of our citizens to dispose of their property, sought to
the system of property ownership and descent which
impose upon the whole10 world
prevails in California. 2
It was noted that the statute "seeks equality of treatment for our citizens
rather than identity of substanive law or governmental structure."' 0 3 Such an
interpretation expectedly led the court to criticize the manner in which the
Gogabashvele majority employed the statute. Moreover, they disagreed with
that court's acceptance of the general operation of the Soviet Government and
its actions towards the free world as evidence of the lack of reciprocity. The
Larkin decision clearly stresses that "such evidence does not truly relate to the
issues before us,' 0 4 and that such evidence should not concern the court.
More recently, the Supreme Court of California reiterated this position in
the case of In re Estate of Chichernea,10 5 in which the heirs of the decedent
were residents of Rumania. The court, relying heavily on the reasoning set
97 Supra note 90.
98 In re Estate of Larkin, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443, 416 P.2d 473, 475 (1966).
99 Id.
100

Id.

101

Id.

102 Id.
103

Id.

104 Id. at 455, 416 P.2d at 487.
1o Supra note 91.
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forth in Larkin, held that "the failure of a nation to ground its system of
inheritance on the philosophy of 'natural rights' does not prejudice the existence of reciprocity required by Probate Code section 259. " 106
It has long been recognized that "reciprocity" statutes are subject to the
operation of a treaty in which the United States agrees with another country
to allow free transfer of property between the countries by will or inheritance. 10 7 A "reciprocity" statute, by depriving a foreign resident of all right
to an estate, would certainly be a contravention of such a treaty. Thus, as in
"benefit" states, a treaty may (as limited below), by itself, be sufficient to
obtain an inheritance for a foreign resident.' 0 8
Because of the nature of the "reciprocity" statutes, courts, whose decisions
are governed thereby, must aim their inquiry at the date of decedent's death,
rather than at the time of probate as is the case with "benefit" statutes. If
reciprocity does not exist at the time of decedent's death, the subsequent
passage of a treaty or change of circumstances in the foreign country will be
of no significance as it is in "benefit" states. The beneficiary must have an
interest as of the date of decedent's death, or he never will have an interest.
The "reciprocity" statute has, as has the "benefit" statute, been criticised
as an infringement upon the federal government's exclusive right to make and
control foreign policy. 109 However, this contention would appear to have been
well settled in the case of Clark v. Allen. 110 The Supreme Court of the United
States, in 1947, held that:
Rights of succession to property are determined by local law . .

.

.Those rights

may be affected by an overriding federal policy, as where a treaty makes different
or conflicting arrangements .... Then the state policy must give way . .

.

.But

here there is no treaty governing the rights of succession to personal property. Nor
has California entered the forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country
...or making a compact with it contrary to the prohibition of Article I, Section 10,
of the Constitution. What California has done will have incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would
claim cross the forbidden line."'
CONCLUSION

During a time when a country is invaded by a foreign power, or when a
country, for any reason, is in a chaotic state, and its banking and postal
106 In re Estate of Chichernea, supra note 91, at 695, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 143.

1o7 Supra note 75.
'OS In re Estate of Spehar, 140 Mont. 76, 367 P.2d 563 (1961). See also Kolovrat v.
Oregon, supra note 75.
109 Supra note 80.

110 Supra note 75.
Ill Supra note 75, at 517.
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channels are disrupted, it is certainly beneficial to all persons involved to have
the distribution of funds to such an area withheld temporarily. Indeed, states
have the duty to insure that decedent's wishes are complied with. Yet, a disposition of property to such areas would surely frustrate such intent. Thus,
it is clear that the states have a valid interest and purpose in placing some
restriction on the distribution of funds of estates located in the United States,
to residents or institutions in foreign countries during such times.
Of the two types of legislation presently used to accomplish this task, the
"benefit" type, it is submitted, is perhaps the better. "Benefit" statutes
theoretically accomplish this purpose since they withhold funds only until the
beneficiary can receive and use them. "Reciprocity" statutes, though valid on
other grounds, do not satisfy this need since under such statutes the with2
holding of funds is permanent."
While the value of the restrictions, if used properly, is clear, the use of a
"benefit" statute in a prejudicial manner in order to discriminate against
certain countries would be contrary to its theoretical purpose and would, the
writer feels, be a direct interference with the federal government's exclusive
authority over foreign affairs.
Some recent New York and New Jersey decisions would seem to indicate
that the courts are tending to restrict the operation and effect of "benefit"
statutes so that the distribution of property will be withheld only when
exceptional conditions exist such as those which prevailed in Europe during
the 1940's. Perhaps, to insure that these statutes will only be used in such
situations, Professor Berman's suggestion of placing the burden of proof of
the factual likelihood of a failure of "benefit" upon the state" 3 should be
incorporated into these statutes. "Reciprocity" could be added as an additional requirement, as is the case in Oregon" 4 but the "benefit" requirement
is needed.
Perhaps the best way in which to have such restrictions would be the enactment of a federal statute similar to the "benefit" statute now used in several
states. This would eliminate the possibility that restrictions or their application would encroach upon the forbidden area of foreign affairs. It would also
help to eliminate the inconsistencies which now characterize the case law. The
federal courts would then be able to develop definitive rules of evidence for
this area. The possibility of antagonizing the "Iron Curtain" countries by such
112 Reciprocity was found to exist between the United States and Germany and also
between the United States and the Netherlands during World War II. Thus, "benefits"
provisions should be present to give courts express authority to temporarily withhold
payment. See, In re Estate of Miller, supra note 91; In re Estate of Blak, supra note 91.
113 Berman, supra note 63, at 263-64.
11 4

ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070(1) (C)(Supp. 1957).
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restrictions is an additional reason for federal control. Perhaps an effective
alternative to federal intervention might be the creation of a commission to
draft uniform legislation governing the disposition of domestic property to
persons residing in foreign countries.
As a practical matter, however, attorneys must be aware of this area of the
law as it exists today. This is true, whether in a state having such legislation
or not, since the estate may be probated in whole or in part in a state
which does.
California appears to have settled its position as a "reciprocity" state. It
merely requires a reasonable showing that United States citizens are given
reciprocal rights with the citizens of the foreign country in question, and
nothing more. California seems to have accomplished a removal of prejudice
and irrelevant considerations from its decisions in the past few years. By
treating the existence of "benefit" more as a question of fact, New York in
recent years has also made great strides towards removing the grounds for
objection to the "benefit" type of legislation.
The objections to the highly prejudicial atmosphere found in the courts and
to an almost irrebuttable presumption in the "benefit" states may have had a
great deal of validity a decade ago. Such criticism may still have validity in
some jurisdictions. 15 It has been recently said that:
The problem of distributions of Pennsylvania estates to Iron Curtain legatees and
devisees is a largely unsettled area of the law. Not only is the validity of existing
state Iron Curtain acts being challenged, but the entire subject is fraught with
political implications and predilections, clouded by the questionable dicta of outmoded cases, and confused by an absence of definitive rules of evidence. n 6
It must always be kept in mind that even under the most favorable conditions presently existing in New York and California there is still a problem
of proving "benefit" and "reciprocity" respectively. In addition, prejudice
may be found in any particular case thereby making a favorable decision very
difficult. Therefore, consideration should always be given to available means
of avoiding such restrictions and the necessity of the problematic litigation
which accompanies them. But in considering such a move, one should recognize that "benefit" states have distributed estates, upon finding the presence
8
of "benefit," to "Iron Curtain" countries including Russia," 7 Bulgaria,"
115 The writer has been unable to find recently reported cases from many of the
jurisdictions having the restrictions herein discussed. Therefore it is very difficult to say
whether the jurisdictions not specifically mentioned, have followed the lead of New York,
New Jersey, California and Montana in this respect.
116 Jones, supra note 21, at 227.
117 In

re Saniuk's Estate, supra note 22.

118 In re Estate of Petroff, supra note 24.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

119

Hungary,
Estonia,120 Czechoslovakia, 121 Yugoslavia,' 22 and Poland.' 2 3
"Reciprocity" states have found "reciprocity" to exist with countries includ27
12
Czechoslovakia,'126 and Yugoslavia.
ing Russia, 124 Rumania,'
Since the "benefit" and "reciprocity" legislation only exist in the probate
courts of the states in which they are enacted, their restriction may be avoided
by avoiding probate. There appear to be no such restrictions by the states or
the federal government, save in time of war or other military confrontation,'128
on the inter vivos disposition of property to countries behind the "Iron
Curtain." Therefore, the advantages and disadvantages of avoiding probate
should be weighed against the disadvantages of the litigation discussed earlier
in order to determine the best possible method for achieving a client's wishes
regarding inclusion of a foreign resident as a beneficiary of the client's estate.
If probate is either desirable or unavoidable, there is yet another way to
avoid the operation of the "benefit" type of restriction insofar as it might
withhold estate funds indefinitely. One may provide for a gift over to another
if the funds cannot be distributed immediately or within a stated period of
time. 1 29 This method might be employed to avoid the restrictive effects of
"reciprocity" statutes. However, the result of such an action is unknown.
Stuart Weisler
119 In re Estate of Wayland, 25 App. Div. 836, 270 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1966); In re Estate
of Siegler, 25 App. Div. 2d 805, 269 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1966); In re Szabados' Will, supra
note 28.
12 0
In re Haab, 31 Misc. 2d 878, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
121In re Karman's Estate, supra note 66; In re Reidl's Will, supra note 26; In re
Estate of Birkner, supra note 24.
122 In re Estate of Primorac, 51 Misc. 2d 166, 272 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Surr. Ct. 1966);
In re Offinger's Estate supra note 24; In re Aras' Estate, supra note 24.
123 In re Tybus' Estate, supra note 28.
124 In re Estate of Larkin, supra note 90; In re Estate of Yarovikoff, 52 Cal. Rptr. 459,
416 P.2d 491 (1966).
125 In re Estate of Chichernea, supra note 91; In re Estate of Gaspar, supra note 91.
126 In re Estate of Hosova, supra note 91.
127 In re Estate of Genn, supra note 91; In re Estate of Spoya, supra note 91.
128 Trading With The Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-31 (1951).
129 In re Van Dam's Estate, 43 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Surr. Ct. 1943).

